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RECENT DECISIONS
If the borrower is unable or unwilling to undertake a 2% "origination"
charge, or a 1% prepayment penalty, the amount of financing procur-
able may be similarly reduced. Thus, the first question is whether the
inherent "definiteness" of the statement of contingency is materially
improved, simply by a recitation of the amount to be borrowed. In
short, will it not be necessary to reach the good faith question "to de-
termine the meaning of the ambiguous phrase" even though it fixes the
basic loan amount, if, like Kovarik, it omits other essential details?
Regardless of the force of these considerations, it will be readily
conceded that where circumstances permit, the safe legal course is to
spell out each of the criteria of acceptability of financing. But is this
solution generally possible or practical? In most instances, the details
of financing are inherently ambiguous and tentative when the condi-
tional contract is executed, because neither the buyer, seller, nor pro-
spective third party lender has any definite idea as to what the ultimate
financing terms will (or can) be. This is the precise reason for inserting
a subject to financing clause. To the extent that detail is specifically
stated it ordinarily amounts to no more than a general stipulation of the
bounds of "reasonable diligence," or "reasonable acceptability," or
"good faith" effort toward determining a future fact.
Thus the court is faced with the dilemma of either strictly interpret-
ing such contracts (and therefore often holding them void, as did the
principal case), or allowing the buyer a broad discretion in his selection
of terms, and running the risk that such discretion may, in certain cases,
be almost unlimited. From the decision of the principal case, it would
not appear that any broadly-applicable choice has been made between
the alternatives. The dilemma remains largely unresolved. It would
now appear that only a total absence of specification of detail, either in
the contract or in the surrounding circumstances, produces no contract.
PETER S. BALISTRERI
International Law: Effect Given by the United States Courts to
Expropriation Decrees of Foreign Governments when in Violation
of International Law-One of the defendants contracted to buy
sugar from a subsidiary of an American-owned Cuban corporation,
the latter to supply the cargo on vessels in Cuba, payment in New York
on delivery. On the same day the sugar was to be loaded on board, a
decree was issued by the Cuban government, nationalizing a number
of Cuban corporations, including the vendor's parent corporation, it
being among those corporations designated by the decree as being con-
trolled by physical or corporate persons of the United States. The
decree was based on defensive measures against alleged aggressive acts
of the United States' government which reduced the Cuban sugar quota
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in the American market. (Under the decree, the former owners were
to be compensated in Cuban bonds of not more than thirty years dura-
tion, paying 2% per annum, with interest payable from a fund set up
of 25% of the foreign exchange received through United States' pur-
chases of sugar exceeding three million tons per year, at a rate not less
than 5.75 cents per pound. The determination of the value of the seized
property was left to the Cuban government). Upon being notified of
the decree, the defendant contracted with the plaintiff, agent of the
Cuban government, to buy the sugar from the new owners. The sugar
was then loaded and delivered in New York, where the defendants
sold it. The receipts of the sale were immediately thereafter frozen by
the receiver of the defunct corporation, the other defendant. Plaintiff,
as agent for the Cuban government, sues for the proceeds of the sale
in a conversion action. The lower court denied plaintiff relief, holding
that the decree violated International law.' Plaintiff then appealed and
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino.
The Act of State doctrine is a widely accepted domestic rule of law,
originating from the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and based on a
desire to promote comity among nations. It declares that the courts of
the forum state cannot question the validity of acts of other states,
whether done according to the law of that state or not, when done by
that other state in regulation, within that state, of the conditions on
which personal and real property may be transmitted, of the status and
capacity of persons located therein, and of the validity of all contracts
made therein.3 The doctrine has been frequently applied by courts of
the United States when deciding issues based on foreign law. It is
usually used to determine the property rights of individuals and states
arising under foreign decrees purporting to act on property located
within the jurisdiction of the forum state, and most often results in
the enforcement of such decrees. However, the doctrine is not a rule of
International law; instead, it is regarded as a rule of conflicts of law,
and, therefore, when applied by a court, the result is not an adjudication
on an International law basis. As a result of this distinction, the court
had a choice in the instant case: it could have adjudicated the contro-
versy on the most frequently applied basis of Act of State or it could
have resorted to a decision based on International law. The court chose
the latter alternative, terming the adjudication on such basis a "narrow
31195 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
2307 F. 2d 845 (2nd Cir. 1962).
330 Am. Jur. International law, §30, at 456. See also Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 293 (1808) ; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) ; Ricaud
v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1897) ; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297 (1917).
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exception" to the doctrine,4 consideration being given, at the same time,
to announcements of the State Department regarding the Cuban seizures.
The turning point of the resultant decision was the finding that the
decree was retaliatory in that it was an act done in response to the
United States' cutting of the Cuban sugar quota, and thus violative of
International law. Examination of the decree leaves little doubt as to
this contention. 5 But while writers have almost unanimously upheld the
theory that an act of retaliation violates international law, case deci-
sions have been conspicuously absent on the subject. Nevertheless, con-
sidering the bases of International law, its sources and origins,6 such a
conclusion cannot be regarded as a judicial non-sequitor, and an exam-
ination of these sources draws the obvious conclusion that retaliation is
invalid under the law of nations. For instance, in the charter of the
Court of International Justice, the sources of International law are
stated to be, among others, general principles of domestic law applied
internationally, and the dissertations of eminent writers on the subject.
Regarding the general principles, most civilized societies have no inter-
nal laws sanctioning personal retaliation measures taken by an injured
party against a tort-feasor who causes him damage. Rather, the general
principles of domestic law forbid this type of redress. The reasoning
supporting this attitude applying with equal persuasiveness to retalia-
tion among nations. And, furthermore, eminent writers on International
law have stated that an act of retaliation violates the law of nations.'
Similarly correct, although on a less concrete basis of reasoning,
was the court's ruling that the discriminatory aspects of the decree re-
sulted in a violation of the law of nations. Where, as here, it is apparent
from the face of the decree" that it is discriminatory, against a particu-
lar group of aliens, writers have indicated that such an act is violative
4Supra note 2, p. 859.
5 Exec. Power Resolution No. 1, issued in accordance with the provisions of
Law No. 851, of July 6, 1960. The decree read, in part, as follows:
"Whereas, in the face of such developments . . . being fully conscious of
their great historical responsibility and in the legitimate defense of the
national economy, (we) are duty bound to adopt the measures deemed
necessary to counteract the harm done by the aggression inflicted on our
nation."
6 WHEATON, ELEiENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 20-21 (1936) ; 1 HYDE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 10-11 (1937).
7RESTATEMENT, FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §205 (1962)
and American Branch of the International Law Association, Proceedings and
Committee Reports, 68 (1957-58).
sExecutive Power Resolution No. 1, issued in accordance with the provisions
of Law No. 851, of July 6, 1960, reading in part, as follows:
. . . to order the nationalization through compulsory expropriation ...
to the Cuban state of all the property and enterprises located in the na-
tional territory, and the rights and interests resulting from the exploitation
of such property . . . owned by judicial persons who are nationals of the
United States of North America, or operators of enterprises in which na-
tionals of said country have a predominating interest."
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of International law.9 It must be pointed out, however, that there are
contrary reasons for upholding an apparently discriminatory decree.
Such may include the fact that the economy of the expropriating state
may be so completely held by the nationals of one particular country
(usually in one particular industry upon which the entire economy of
the expropriating state is based) that an act of nationalization may give
the outward appearance of being discriminatory against a particular
group of aliens while, in reality, the decree is aimed only at the particu-
lar industry which is taken. Such may frequently be the case in the
economies of nations such as Cuba, commonly referred to as the "capi-
tal-importing" nations. Such states are characterized by a domination
of ownership of the factors or production in the hands of aliens who
have brought the capital to the country for investment purposes. This
is in contrast to the "capital-exporting" countries, namely, those where-
in the aliens owning the productive facilities reside. That Cuba was
such a "capital-importing" country and that the Cuban economy was,
basically, a sugar economy whose ups and downs were based on the
economic vagaries of the sugar market. The latter, in turn, being con-
trolled by American holders, fairly states the general condition in that
country at the time of the decree. Thus, in the absence of other evidence
of discrimination, a decree expropriating American owned property
might be justified, at least insofar as the question of discrimination is
concerned. Furthermore, unlike in cases of retaliation, where diplomatic
relations cannot be advantageously utilized to promote the interest of
citizens of the foreign state (whose citizens' property is being taken),
where decrees are discriminatory only, such channels of redress could
conceivably be used, as such means are now used when decrees do not
discriminate. Yet, in any case, where the discrimination is based on re-
taliation, as it is here, there is good reason, notwithstanding the argu-
ments of the "capital-importing" states, to hold that the decree violates
International law.
Not finding it necessary to decide whether the failure of the decree
to provide adequate compensation violated International law, the court
avoided taking a stand on this controversial issue. The controversy
amounts to this: on the one hand, the "capital-importing" states declare
adamantly that, when the purpose of expropriation is for the improve-
ment of social welfare or for economic reform, there is no duty to
compensate fully, their position being backed by much authority ;1o yet,
9 RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §170 and
11. 2 (1962); Standard Oil Tankers Case, 22 Am. J. INT'L L. 404, 419-20(1928) ; 19 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 408 (1948) ; Netherlands note to Indonesia,
Dec. 18, 1959, 54 Ai. 3. INT'L L. 484, 485-7 (1960); Rolin, 6 NETHERLANDS
INT'L L. REV. 260, 269 (1959); Solin, In Proceedings of the American Branch
of the International Law Association 1959-60, at p. 31.
10 FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 206 (1953) ; Baade, Indo-
nesian Nationalization Mea-ures Before Foreign Courts-A Reply, 54 Am.
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on the other hand, the "capital-exporting" nations demand the payment
of "just" compensation, which is usually meant to be compensation at
100% of value, they too, being backed by much authority.- Had the
court decided the point either way, the verdict would have been the
same, since the decree was found to violate International law on its
discriminatory and retaliatory aspects. As a result, the question of ade-
quacy of compensation remains without adjudication in the American
courts.
As a basis for deciding the question on an International law basis,
rather than on the more conventional Act of State doctrine, the court
was led by a directive from the State Department as to the official gov-
ernment position on the decrees. This directive consisted of somewhat
uncertain statements 12 issued from various sources in the State Depart-
ment to the litigants in this and another case,' 3 which stated that the
question of the effect of the decrees was for the courts to decide, giv-
ing what might be interpreted as a "green light" to the courts to disre-
gard the Act of State doctrine. These apparent pronouncements of the
Executive branch have been previously used, but in somewhat different
circumstances as a means of guiding the courts. In Pink v. United
States,'4 the act of the President in recognizing the Soviet Union as
part of an executive agreement to assign to the United States all claims
of the Soviet government to assets held by Russian corporations before
nationalization that were situated in the United States resulted in a loss
of such assets to the stockholders of the corporations, whose rights were
otherwise secured and recognized in New York.' 5 Thus, in this way, the
Executive acted to change the course of previous adjudications through
the recognition of a foreign regime. More recently, and bearing directly
upon this case due to the directive to the courts involved, was the policy
of the State Department showing interest in foreign decrees of expro-
priation. The first such indication of this policy arose shortly after
World War II, concerning the acts of the then defunct Nazi regime.
In the first case,' the dispossessed plaintiff was denied recovery on the
J. INT'L L. 801, 803-4 (1960) ; Williams, International Law and the Property
of Aliens, BRaIT. YD. INT'L L. (1928); BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS, 178 (1936).
"1 RESTATEmENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §190, com-
ment a, (1962) ; Anderson, Title to Confiscated Foreign Property, 20 All. J.
INT'L L. 528-9 (1926); Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before
Foreign Courts, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 305 (1960).
22 State Dept. Bull. April 13, 1961; Statement of the Legal Advisor to the Ainici,
Oct. 18, 1961; Statement of the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, Nov. 14,
1961.
23 Kane v. Nat. Institute of Agrarian Reform, (no. 61 L. 730) Fla. Cir. Ct.
(1961).
14315 U.S. 552 (1942). See also Belmont v. United States, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
'5 Pink v. United States, 284 N.Y. 555, 32 N.E. 552 (1941).
'
6 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F. 2d 246 (1947),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
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basis of the Act of State doctrine. But in the second case, 7 on appeal,
this was reversed due to an intervening State Department announce-
ment that declared that the validity of the decrees was for the courts
to determine,' thus reversing the previous adjudications. But viewing
the Pink, Belmont and Bernstein cases in the light of this case, it is
seen that, on one hand, the Bernstein cases involved the acts of a de-
funct regime whose lack of existence could no longer justify the use of
the Act of State doctrine (as there would be no interference with the
comity of nations on which the doctrine is based) ; while, on the other
hand, the Pink and Belmont cases dealt with an executive agreement,
authorizing constitutionally to the President in his power to grant rec-
ognition, thus exercisable at a higher level of authority than the Act of
State doctrine, which itself, is of judicial origin and within the court's
general discretion to apply. Thus, it appears that while the acts of the
Executive were justified in the Pink and Belmont cases on a constitu-
tional basis and in the Bernstein cases on a lack of comity basis, it could
not be held so justifiable in this case where the government whose de-
cree was in question was presently in control of its territory and had
diplomatic ties with the United States, it being seemingly possible that
without such pronouncements the court would have applied the Act of
State doctrine and decided the case differently. This leads to the con-
clusion that such executive pronouncements could be viewed as a poss-
ible breach of the separation of powers through the influence of the
Executive on the course of adjudications in the courts.
As a first impression, the case definitely sets a precedent in the use
of State Department pronouncements as a direction-steering device for
courts of law regarding the acts of presently existing governments.
Although this device probably will not result in the discarding of the
Act of State doctrine due to the doctrine's long established use, it sug-
gests that there may be exceptions where the Act of State doctrine
would not be applied. This could result, due to the method whereby such
announcements are made, in a hesitancy of attorneys for the various
litigants concerning the validity of their causes of action, due to poten-
tial variances in verdicts in time due to intervening State Department
pronouncements. Should the point ever be brought up on appeal, the
Supreme Court might very well reverse and call for a new trial to be
27 Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
210 F. 2d 375 (1954).
Is State Dept. Press Release 296, Apr. 27, 1949, stating in part, as follows:
"This letter repeats the Government's opposition to forcible acts of dis-
possession of a discriminatory and confiscatory nature practiced by the
Germans on peoples subject to their controls; . . . it is this Government's
policy to undo the forced transfers and restitute identifiable property
to victims of Nazi persecution wrongfully deprived . . . the policy of the
executive . . . is to relieve American courts from any restraints upon the




decided, without reference to the announcements of the State Depart-
ment. Also, it may result in the deciding of decrees' validity on an
International law basis in disputes between former owners of seized
property and bona fide purchasers, thus, in effect, spelling out an event-
ual discarding of the other theories of enforcing or denying enforce-
ment to foreign decrees of expropriation. This will, therefore, cause
greater consideration of International law in the Municipal courts than
has been given up to now.
SHERIN SCHAPIRO
Libel and Slander: Defamation by Television Broadcast Is Action-
able Per Se-As a result of a presentation on a television pro-
gram known as "The Untouchables," plaintiff, a retired prison guard,
brought an action against defendant television companies alleging that
they had defamed him by presenting a sequence showing that a prison
guard accepted a bribe while attending a prisoner during a railway
transfer from a federal prison in Atlanta to Alcatraz. Plaintiff alleged
in the Superior Court of Georgia that such production clearly indicated
that such Federal officer aided and abetted the Federal prisoner, in this
case one Alphonse Capone, in his attempt to unlawfully escape from
confinement. Defendants demurrers were overruled and on appeal the
Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed and held that such television
presentation was actionable per se as "defamacast" and that plaintiff
could maintain the action either by showing that he was the guard spe-
cifically referred to or as a member of a two-man group. American
Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson.'
The Court of Appeals of Georgia in this decision squarely faced
the problem of determining whether defamation by television is to be
categorized for purposes of litigation as libel or slander. The court
determined that television defamation as such is not easily classified
within the age-old torts of libel or slander, and furthermore, that the
medium of television has outmoded the principles which form the basis
for the distinction between the two actions. Therefore, this court took
upon itself the task of establishing a new cause of action uniquely de-
signed to cover situations involving defamation by means of mass media
communications. The court has termed this as "defamacast." The ra-
tionale which justifies this departure, at least in terms of nomenclature,
from the established forms of libel and slander is that modern law
must be able to keep pace with modern technological growth. The law
of television and radio defamation is quite obviously only as old as the
mediums themselves are, and therefore the body of decision law is
sparse. The basic distinction between libel and slander has been the
1126 S.E. 2d 873 (Ga. 1962).
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